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This bulletin presents the revised results of a study previously released in August 1999 (NICPRE 
99-04). Several minor changes were made in the methodology, and the results have subsequently 
changed as well. In addition, a decision was made to only estimate an average benefit-cost ratio 
for the Dairy Act (and not the Fluid Milk Act) since the data for the fluid milk processor price 
was deemed to be not very reliable. If the reader has access to the earlier report (NICPRE 99­
04), please use the revised results in the current report instead.
This report is published as a NICPRE research bulletin. The mission of NICPRE is to enhance 
the overall understanding of economic and policy issues associated with commodity promotion 
programs. An understanding of these issues is crucial to ensuring continued authorization for 
domestic checkoff programs and to fund export promotion programs.
Each year, NICPRE provides an updated analysis of the national dairy advertising program. This 
year, the report serves as the independent evaluation for the required report to Congress. This 
bulletin summarizes the independent evaluation of advertising under the national dairy and fluid 
milk checkoff programs. This report should help farmers, fluid milk processors, and policy 
makers in understanding the economic impacts of generic dairy advertising on the national 
markets for milk and dairy products.
3Executive Summary
The Dairy Production and Stabilization Act of 1983 (Dairy Act 7 U.S.C. 4514) and the Fluid Milk 
Promotion Act of 1990 (Fluid Milk Act 7 U.S.C. 6407) require an independent analysis of the 
effectiveness of these programs as they operate in conjunction to increase the sale of fluid milk 
and dairy products. The U.S. Department of Agriculture carried out this independent evaluation 
in the past, and annually issued a report to Congress on the effectiveness of the two Acts. This 
year's evaluation was conducted by NICPRE. Unlike past evaluations which have relied on a 12 
market model for the fluid milk evaluation, and two cheese models for the cheese evaluation, this 
year's evaluation is based on a detailed economic model of the U.S. dairy industry. This model is 
unique in its level of disaggregation. For instance, the dairy industry is divided into retail, 
wholesale (processing), and farm markets, and the retail and wholesale markets include fluid milk 
and cheese separately. The model simulates market conditions with and without the Dairy Act and 
the Fluid Milk Act. The following summarizes the findings of this analysis.
Generic fluid milk and dairy product advertising conducted under the Dairy and Fluid Milk 
Acts had a major impact on dairy market conditions. Over the period 1996-98, on average, 
following market impacts would have occurred if the two programs had not been in effect:
• Fluid milk consumption would have been 1.8 percent lower.
• Cheese consumption would have been 0.3 percent lower.
• Total consumption of milk in all dairy products would have been 0.8 percent lower.
• The average price received by dairy farmers would have been almost 5.1 percent, or $0.73 
per cwt lower.
• Commercial milk marketings by farmers would have been 0.7 percent lower.
• The average benefit-cost ratio for the Dairy Act was 4.61, i.e., a dollar invested in generic 
fluid milk and cheese advertising by dairy farmers resulted in a return of $4.61 in net 
revenues.
4Impact of Generic Fluid Milk and Cheese Advertising on Dairy Markets, 1984-98
Dairy farmers pay a mandatory assessment of 15 cents per hundred pounds of milk marketed in 
the continental United States to fund a national demand expansion program. The aims of this 
program are to increase consumer demand for fluid milk and dairy products, enhance dairy farm 
revenue, and reduce the amount of surplus milk purchased by the government under the Dairy 
Price Support Program. Legislative authority for these assessments is contained in the Dairy and 
Tobacco Adjustment Act of 1983. To increase fluid milk and dairy product consumption, the 
National Dairy Promotion and Research Board (NDPRB) was established to invest in generic 
dairy advertising and promotion, nutrition research, education, and new product development. 
More recently, fluid milk processors began their own generic fluid milk advertising program (the 
Milk Mustache print media campaign), which is funded by a mandatory $0.20 per hundredweight 
processor checkoff on fluid milk sales.
Each year, the Cornell Commodity Promotion Research Program (CCPRP) estimates the 
impact of the generic advertising effort on the U.S. dairy industry. U.S. dairy industry data are 
updated each year and used with a dairy industry model to measure the impact of generic 
advertising milk and cheese on prices and quantities for fluid milk and dairy products. The model 
used is based on a dynamic econometric model of the U.S. dairy industry estimated using 
quarterly data from 1975 through 1998, and is unique from previous models of the U.S. dairy 
sector in its level of disaggregation. For instance, the dairy industry is divided into retail, 
wholesale, and farm markets, and the retail and wholesale markets include fluid milk and cheese as 
separate markets. Markets for butter and frozen products are included in the model, but are 
treated as being exogenous since the focus is on fluid milk and cheese advertising. Econometric 
results are used to simulate market conditions with and without the national programs.
5The results of this study are important for dairy farmers, fluid milk processors, and policy 
makers given that the dairy industry has the largest generic promotion program of all U.S. 
agricultural commodities. Over $200 million is raised annually by the checkoff on dairy farmers, 
and the majority of this is invested in media advertising of fluid milk and cheese. In addition, over 
$100 million is raised annually by the checkoff on fluid milk processors. Farmers and processors 
certainly want to know whether their advertising investment is paying off. Consequently, the 
annual measurement of generic dairy advertising is an important objective of the CCPRP.
Background
Prior to 1984, there was no national mandatory checkoff for dairy advertising and promotion. 
However, many states had their own checkoff programs, which were primarily used for promoting 
and advertising fluid milk. Because of the huge surplus milk problem beginning in the early 
1980s, Congress passed the Dairy and Tobacco Adjustment Act in 1983. This Act was designed 
to reduce the milk surplus by implementing a voluntary supply control program (Milk Diversion 
Program) and authorizing a mandatory checkoff for demand expansion. The mandatory checkoff 
program, which was subsequently approved by dairy farmers in a national referendum, resulted in 
the creation of the NDPRB.
The generic advertising effort under the mandatory checkoff program initially emphasized 
manufactured dairy products, since 10 of the 15 cents of the checkoff went to state promotion 
programs, which were primarily fluid programs. The initial emphasis on manufactured advertising 
is evident from appendix figure 1, which shows quarterly generic fluid advertising expenditures in 
the United States from 1975-98, deflated by the Media Cost Index. At the national level, generic 
fluid advertising expenditures did not significantly change immediately following the creation of
6this mandatory program. In fact, it was not until the mid-1990s that there was a significant 
increase in generic fluid milk advertising expenditures, which occurred after the NDPRB merged 
with the United Dairy Industry Association (UDIA). Subsequently, the amount of fluid 
advertising has increased significantly. With the inception of the MilkPEP program (the Milk 
Mustache print media campaign) in 1995, generic fluid milk advertising increased substantially.
Appendix figure 2 shows quarterly generic cheese advertising in the United States from 
1975-98. It is clear from this figure that the initial focus was on generic cheese (and other 
manufactured products) advertising of manufactured dairy products. Generic cheese advertising, 
as well as generic butter and ice cream advertising (not shown) increased substantially after the 
mandatory checkoff program was introduced. However, since the mid-1980s, generic advertising 
of cheese steadily declined in favor of generic fluid advertising until very recently. This trend is 
most likely due to the fact that dairy farmers received a higher price for milk going into fluid 
products. Hence, increasing the utilization of fluid milk into fluid products is an effective way to 
increase the average farm price.
Conceptual Model
Much research has been conducted on the impacts of generic dairy advertising. For example, in 
an annotated bibliography of generic commodity promotion research, Ferrero et al. listed 29 
economic studies on dairy over the period, 1992-96. Some of this research has been at the state 
level with New York state being studied extensively (e.g., Kinnucan, Chang, and Venkateswaran, 
Kaiser and Reberte, Reberte et al., Lenz, Kaiser, and Chung). These studies have used single 
equation techniques to estimate demand equations (usually for fluid milk) as functions of own 
price, substitute price, income, population demographics, and advertising. There have been
7several recent national studies done as well (e.g., Blisard and Blaylock, Liu et al., 1990, Cornick 
and Cox, Suzuki et al., Wohlgenant and Clary). Of these, the most disaggregated in terms of 
markets and products is the study by Liu et al (1990), who developed a multiple market, multiple 
product dairy industry model to measure the impacts of fluid milk and manufactured dairy product 
generic advertising.
The econometric model presented here is similar in structure to the industry model 
developed by Liu et al. (1990, 1991). Both Liu et al. (1990, 1991) and the current model are 
partial equilibrium models of the domestic dairy sector (with no trade) that divides the dairy 
industry into retail, wholesale, and farm markets. However, while Liu et al. (1990, 1991) 
classified all manufactured products into one category (Class III), the present model focuses on 
cheeses rather than on other manufactured dairy products. Cheese is the most important 
manufactured dairy product in terms of market value as well as in amount of advertising. Since 
there is no longer much dairy farmer money invested in advertising butter and ice cream, these 
two products are treated as being exogenous in the industry model.
In the farm market, Grade A (fluid eligible) milk is produced by farmers and sold to 
wholesalers. The wholesale market is disaggregated into two sub-markets: fluid (beverage) milk 
and cheese.1 Wholesalers process the milk into these products and sell them to retailers, who then 
sell the products to consumers. The model assumes that farmers, wholesalers, and retailers 
behave competitively in the market. This assumption is supported empirically by two recent 
studies. Liu, Sun, and Kaiser estimated the market power of fluid milk and manufacturing milk 
processors, concluding that both behaved quite competitively over the period 1982-1992. Suzuki
1 All quantities in the model (except fluid milk) are expressed on a milkfat equivalent (me) basis. Fluid milk is 
expressed in product form in pounds.
8et al. measured the degree of market imperfection in the fluid milk industry and found the degree 
of imperfection to be relatively small and declining over time.
It is assumed that the two major federal programs that regulate the dairy industry (Federal 
milk marketing orders and the Dairy Price Support Program) are in effect. Since this is a national 
model, it is assumed that there is one Federal milk marketing order regulating all milk marketed in 
the nation. The Federal milk marketing order program is incorporated by restricting the prices 
wholesalers pay for raw milk to be the minimum class prices. For example, fluid milk wholesalers 
pay the higher Class I price, while cheese wholesalers pay the lower Class III price. The Dairy 
Price Support Program is incorporated into the model by restricting the wholesale cheese price to 
be greater than or equal to the government purchase prices for cheese. With the government 
offering to buy unlimited quantities of storable manufactured dairy products at announced 
purchase prices, the program indirectly supports the farm milk price by increasing farm-level milk 
demand.
Retail markets are defined by sets of supply and demand functions, in addition to 
equilibrium conditions that require supply and demand to be equal. Since the market is 
disaggregated into fluid milk and cheese, there are two sets of these equations. Each set has the 
following general specification:
(1.1) RiD = f(RiP|Sird),
(1.2) RiS = f(RiP|Sirs),
(1.3) RiD = RiS °  Ri*, i = fluid milk (F), cheese (C),
where: RiD and RiS are retail demand and supply for fluid milk and cheese, respectively, RiP is 
the retail own price for fluid milk and cheese, respectively, Sird is a vector of retail demand
9shifters including generic advertising for fluid milk and cheese, respectively, Sirs is a vector of 
retail supply shifters including the wholesale own price for fluid milk and cheese, respectively, and 
Ri* is the equilibrium retail quantity for fluid milk and cheese, respectively.
The wholesale market is also defined by two sets of supply and demand functions, and two 
sets of equilibrium conditions. The wholesale fluid milk market has the following general 
specification:
(2.1) WFD = RF*,
(2.2) WFS = f(WFP|SFws),
(2.3) WFS = WFD °  WF* °  RF*,
where: WFD and WFS are wholesale fluid milk demand and supply, respectively, WFP is the
wholesale fluid milk price, and SFws is a vector of wholesale fluid milk supply shifters, including 
the Class I price, which is equal to the Class III milk price (i.e., the Basic Formula price) plus a 
fixed fluid milk differential. Note that the wholesale level demand functions do not have to be 
estimated since the equilibrium conditions constrain wholesale demand to be equal to the 
equilibrium retail quantity. The assumption that wholesale demand equals retail quantity implies a 
fixed-proportions production technology.
The direct impacts of the Dairy Price Support Program occur at the wholesale cheese 
market level. It is at this level that the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) provides an 
alternative source of demand at announced purchase prices. In addition, cheese can be stored as 
inventories, which represent another source of demand not present with fluid milk. Consequently, 
the equilibrium conditions for the cheese wholesale market differs from those for the fluid milk 
market. The wholesale cheese market has the following general specification:
(3.1) WCD = RC*,
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(3.2) WCS = f(WCP|SCws),
(3.3) WCS = WCD + DINVC + QSPC °  QCw,
where: WCD and WCS are wholesale cheese demand and supply, respectively, WCP is the 
wholesale cheese price, SCws is a vector of wholesale cheese supply shifters including the Class 
III milk price, DINVC is change in commercial cheese inventories, QSPC is quantity of cheese 
sold by specialty plants to the government, and QCw is the equilibrium wholesale cheese quantity. 
The variables DINVC and QSPC represent a small proportion of total milk production and are 
assumed to be exogenous in this model.2
The Dairy Price Support Program is incorporated in the model by constraining the 
wholesale cheese price to be not less than their respective government purchase prices, i.e.:
(4.1) WCP > GCP,
where: WCP and GCP are the wholesale cheese price and government purchase price for cheese.
Because of the Dairy Price Support Program, two regimes are possible: (1) WCP > GCP, 
and (2) WCP = GCP. In the first case, where the market is competitive, equilibrium condition
(3.3) applies. However, in the second case, where the market is being supported by the Dairy 
Price Support Program, equilibrium condition (3.3) is changed to:
(3.3a) WCS = WCD + DINVC + QSPC + GC °  WC,
2 Certain cheese plants sell products to the government only, regardless of the relationship between the wholesale 
market price and the purchase price. These are general balancing plants that remove excess milk from the market 
when supply is greater than demand, and process the milk into cheese which is then sold to the government. 
Because of this, the quantity of milk purchased by the government was disaggregated into purchases from these 
specialized plants and other purchases. In a competitive regime, the "other purchases" are expected to be zero, 
while the purchases from specialty plants may be positive. The QSPC variable was determined by computing the 
average amount of government purchases of cheese during competitive periods, i.e., when the wholesale price was 
greater than the purchase price.
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where: GC is government purchases of cheese, which becomes the new endogenous variable, 
replacing the wholesale cheese price.
The farm raw milk market is represented by the following milk supply equation:
(5.1) FMS = f(E[AMP]|Sfm),
where: FMS is commercial milk marketings in the United States, E[AMP] is the expected all milk
price, and Sfm is a vector of milk supply shifters. As in the model developed by LaFrance and de 
Gorter and by Kaiser, a perfect foresight specification is used for the expected farm milk price.
The farm milk price is a weighted average of the Class prices for milk, with the weights 
equal to the utilization of milk among products:
(5.2) AMP = (P3 + d) WFS + P3 WCS + P3 (OTHER)
WFS + WCS + OTHER
where: P3 is the Class III price, d is the Class I fixed fluid milk differential (therefore the Class I 
price is equal to P3 + d), WFS is wholesale fluid milk supply, WCS is wholesale cheese supply, 
and OTHER is wholesale supply of other manufactured dairy products (principally butter and 
frozen dairy products), which are treated as exogenous in the model.
Finally, the model is closed by the following equilibrium condition:
(5.3) FMS = WFS + WCS + FUSE + OTHER,
where FUSE is on-farm use of milk, which is treated as exogenous.
Econometric Estimation
The equations were estimated simultaneously using an instrumental variable approach for all 
prices and quarterly data from 1975 through 1998. Specifically, all prices were regressed using 
ordinary least squares on the exogenous variables in the model, and the resulting fitted values
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were used as instrumental price variables in the structural equations. The econometric package 
used was EViews (Hall, Lilien, and Johnston). All equations in the model were specified in 
double-logarithm functional form. Variable definitions, data sources and estimation results are 
presented in the appendix. In terms of statistical fit, most of the estimated equations were found 
to be reasonable with respect to R2. The lowest adjusted coefficient of determination for any 
equation was 0.92, which is quite respectable.
The retail market demand functions were estimated on a per capita basis, and the 
following variables were included as demand determinants: Consumer Price Index (CPI) for fluid 
milk; CPI for non-alcoholic beverages, which was used as a proxy for fluid milk substitutes; per 
capita disposable income; consumer expenditures on food consumed away from home, which has 
a negative impact on fluid milk demand; percent of U.S. population five years old or younger, 
which has a positive effect on fluid milk demand; an indicator variable for when bovine 
somatotropin was approved for commercial use, which may have a negative impact on fluid milk 
demand; quarterly indicator variables to capture seasonality in fluid milk demand; brand fluid milk 
advertising and generic fluid milk advertising.3 To account for the impact of inflation, the CPI for 
fluid milk and income were deflated by the CPI for non-alcoholic beverages. This specification 
was followed because there was strong correlation between prices. To measure the generic 
advertising by the dairy industry, generic fluid milk advertising expenditures were included as 
explanatory variables in the demand equation. Since 1995, fluid milk processors have funded their 
own generic fluid milk advertising program. In the econometric estimation, the fluid milk 
processors’ generic advertising expenditures were added to dairy farmer advertising expenditures. 
Brand and generic fluid milk advertising was measured as the amount of expenditures per quarter
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deflated by the Media Cost Index. To capture the dynamics of advertising in the demand model, 
generic and brand advertising expenditures were specified as a second-order polynomial 
distributed lag. The length of the lag was initially varied between one and six quarters and the 
final specification was chosen based on goodness of fit. Finally, a first-order moving average 
error structure was imposed on the retail fluid milk demand equation to correct for 
autocorrelation.
The following variables were included as determinants of per capita cheese demand: CPI 
for cheese; CPI for meat, which was used as a proxy for cheese substitutes; per capita disposable 
income; consumer expenditures on food consumed away from home, which, unlike fluid milk, has 
a positive impact on cheese demand; quarterly indicator variables to capture seasonality in cheese 
demand; brand cheese advertising and generic cheese advertising. Similar estimation procedures 
were used to estimate cheese demand as were used to estimate fluid milk demand. Generic and 
brand advertising expenditures were specified as a second-order polynomial distributed lag, and 
the length of the lag was initially varied between one and six quarters and the final specification 
was chosen based on goodness of fit. Finally, a first- and second-order autoregressive error 
structure was imposed on the retail cheese demand equation to correct for autocorrelation.
The relative impacts of variables affecting demand can be represented with "elasticities," 
which measure the percentage change in per capita demand given a one percent change in one of 
the identified demand factors. Table 1 presents the estimated elasticity values for selected demand 
factors for fluid milk and cheese. For example, the income elasticity of demand for fluid milk 
equal to 0.215 means that a one percent increase in per capita income has the impact of increasing 
per capita fluid milk demand by 0.215 percent. The most important factor effecting per capita 3
3 All generic and brand advertising expenditures come from various issues of Leading National Advertisers.
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fluid milk demand is the percentage of population under 6 years old. After peaking in 1993, the 
percentage of population under 6 years old declined which has had a large negative effect on per 
capita fluid milk demand. The most important factor effecting per capita cheese demand is 
expenditures on food consumed away from home. There has been consistent increases in food 
consumed away from home over time and this has had an important impact on increasing per 
capita cheese demand.
Based on the econometric estimation, generic fluid milk advertising had the largest long- 
run advertising elasticity of 0.057 and was statistically different from zero at the one percent 
significance level. This means a one percent increase in generic fluid advertising expenditures 
resulted in a 0.057 percent increase in fluid demand on average over this period, which is higher 
than previous results. For example, based on a similar model with data from 1975-97, Kaiser 
estimated a long-run elasticity of 0.029 for generic fluid milk advertising. Other studies have 
found comparable estimates, e.g., Kinnucan estimated a long-run fluid milk advertising elasticity 
of 0.051 for New York City; and Kinnucan, Chang, and Venkateswaran estimated a long-run 
fluid milk advertising elasticity of 0.016 for New York City. The elasticity of generic advertising 
for cheese was also positive, but had a t-value of 1.2 which is not statistically significant from zero 
at the 10 percent significance level. The generic cheese advertising elasticity was almost four 
times smaller in magnitude than the generic elasticity for advertising of fluid milk. One reason 
why generic fluid milk advertising may be more effective in increasing demand than generic cheese 
advertising is that fluid milk is a much more homogeneous product than cheese. The long run 
generic cheese advertising elasticity was 0.015, which is slightly higher than the previous estimate 
of 0.011 by Kaiser. Branded cheese advertising was positive, and had a long run advertising 
elasticity of 0.024. Therefore, it appears that branded cheese advertising is an effective marketing
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tool for increasing total market cheese demand. However, its t-value of 1.3 was only marginally 
significant.
The retail supply for each product was estimated as a function of the following variables: 
1) retail price, 2) wholesale price, which represents the major variable cost to retailers, 3) 
producer price index for fuel and energy, 4) lagged retail supply, 5) time trend variable, and 6) 
quarterly dummy variables. The producer price index for fuel and energy was used as a proxy for 
variable energy costs. All prices and costs were deflated by the wholesale product price 
associated with each equation. The quarterly dummy variables were included to capture 
seasonality in retail supply, while the lagged supply variables were incorporated to represent 
capacity constraints. The time trend variable was included as a proxy for technological change in 
retailing. Finally, a first-order autoregressive error structure was imposed on the retail fluid milk 
supply equation.
The wholesale supply for each product was estimated as a function of the following 
variables: 1) wholesale price, 2) the appropriate Class price for milk, which represents the main 
variable cost to wholesalers, 3) producer price index for fuel and energy, 4) lagged wholesale 
supply, 5) time trend variable, and 6) quarterly dummy variables. The producer price index for 
fuel and energy was included because energy costs are important variable costs to wholesalers. 
All prices and costs were deflated by the price of farm milk, i.e., Class price. The quarterly 
dummy variables were used to capture seasonality in wholesale supply, lagged wholesale supply 
was included to reflect capacity constraints, and the trend variable was incorporated as a measure 
of technological change in dairy product processing.
For the farm milk market, the farm milk supply was estimated as a function of the 
following variables: 1) ratio of the farm milk price to feed ration costs, 2) ratio of the price of
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slaughter cows to feed ration costs, 3) lagged milk supply, 4) intercept dummy variables to 
account for the quarters that the Milk Diversion and Dairy Termination Programs were in effect, 
5) quarterly dummy variables, and 6) time trend variable. Feed ration costs represent the most 
important variable costs in milk production, while the price of slaughtered cows represents an 
important opportunity cost to dairy farmers. Lagged milk supply was included as biological 
capacity constraints to current milk supply.
Average Market Impacts of Farmer and Fluid Milk Processor Advertising
The market impacts of generic fluid milk and cheese advertising by dairy farmers and fluid milk 
processors were examined over the time period, 1996-1998 The generic fluid milk advertising 
programs by dairy farmers (herein called the "Farmer Program") and fluid milk processors (herein 
called the "Processor Program") are complimentary since they both share a common objective to 
increase fluid milk sales. To do this, both programs invest in generic fluid milk advertising, which 
is different from brand advertising since the goal is to increase the total market for fluid milk 
rather than to increase a specific brand's market share. In the evaluation of the two programs, it is 
assumed that a dollar spent on fluid milk advertising by dairy farmers has the same effect on 
demand as a dollar spent by processors on fluid milk advertising, since both programs have 
identical objectives. The Farmer Program has an additional objective to expand the market for 
cheese. Accordingly, part of its budget is directed to generic cheese advertising.
To examine the impacts that the Farmer and Processor Programs had on the markets for 
fluid milk and cheese over this period, the economic model was simulated under two scenarios 
based on the volume of generic advertising expenditures: 1) a baseline scenario, where
advertising levels were equal to actual generic advertising expenditures under the two programs,
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and 2) a no-national program scenario, where there was no Processor Program and quarterly 
values of generic advertising expenditures by dairy farmers were based on a national average 
assessment of 6.3 cents per hundredweight, which was the average assessment the year prior to 
the enactment of the Dairy Program. A comparison of these two scenarios provides a measure of 
the impacts of the two programs.
Table 2 presents the annual averages for selected variables over the period, 1996-98 for 
the two scenarios. The fifth column in this table is the percentage change in each market variable 
had the two programs not existed over this period of time. Generic advertising resulting from the 
Farmer and Processor Programs has had a substantially larger impact on fluid milk consumption 
than on cheese consumption. Specifically, fluid milk and cheese consumption would have been 
1.8 percent and 0.3 percent lower had the two programs not been enacted. This larger impact on 
fluid milk consumption than on cheese consumption is a result of two factors: (1) more money 
was spent on generic fluid milk advertising than generic cheese advertising, and (2) generic fluid 
milk advertising had a larger elasticity than generic cheese advertising (i.e., a one percent change 
in generic fluid milk advertising had a larger percentage impact on fluid milk consumption than the 
percentage impact on cheese consumption from a one percent change in generic cheese 
advertising). Consumption of milk used in all dairy products would have been 0.8 percent lower 
had these two programs not been in effect during 1995-98.
Generic advertising also had an effect on farm milk prices and milk marketings. The 
simulation results indicate that the Basic Formula Price and the all milk price would have been 5.3 
percent, 0.71 percent, and 0.73 percent lower without the generic advertising provided under the 
two programs. The farm milk price impacts resulted in a marginal increase in farm milk
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marketings. That is, had there not been the two advertising programs, farm milk marketings 
would have been 0.7 percent lower over the 1996-98 period due to the lower milk price.
Benefit-Cost of the Dairy Program
One way to measure whether the benefits of a program outweigh the cost is to compute a benefit- 
cost ratio (BCR). A BCR can be estimated as the change in net revenue due to advertising 
divided by the cost of advertising. While a BCR can be estimated for the Farmer Program, it 
cannot be computed at this time for the Processer Program because of inaccurate data on 
packaged fluid milk wholesale prices, which is necessary in calculating processor net revenue.
The BCR for the Dairy Program was calculated as the change in dairy farmer net revenue4 
due to the existence of the Dairy Act divided by the costs of the Dairy Program. The cost of the 
Dairy Program was measured as the 15 cents per hundredweight assessment. The results show 
that the average BCR for the Dairy Program was 4.61 from 1996 through 1998. This means that 
each dollar invested in generic fluid milk and cheese advertising by dairy farmers during the period 
returned $4.61, on average, in net revenue to farmers.
Caveat on Fluid Milk Processor Price Impacts
The impact of the two programs on the fluid milk processors' price is not reported in Table 2. 
The reason for this is explained below.
The wholesale fluid milk supply equation was estimated as a function of several variables, 
including the wholesale fluid milk price index. While the own price elasticity computed with this 
data was positive and statistically significant, it was very inelastic (0.049). This very inelastic price
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estimate has a major implication for the simulation in that even very small increases in demand 
lead to huge simulated increases in the processor price. Indeed, when the baseline and no-national 
program scenarios were simulated, the results indicated that the two programs had the impact of 
increasing the processor price by more than 20 percent, an implausible result.
Several attempts were made to try to remedy this problem. The best solution was to 
increase the own price elasticity of wholesale fluid milk supply and farm milk supply to the upper 
bound of 90 percent confidence intervals for the two respective estimated own price coefficients. 
This solution, in fact, is what was done for the scenarios reported in Table 2 of the text. 
However, even after this was done, the simulated increases for the fluid milk processor price due 
to the two programs was still rather high, at 14.5 percent. While the author found this estimate to 
be plausible, several dairy experts considered this to be too large. Various attempts were made to 
re-estimate the econometric equation for the wholesale milk supply, but none resulted in a higher 
own price elasticity.
Two factors may be causing this inelastic own price coefficient. First, the estimated 
elasticity may in fact be highly inelastic in the neighborhood of very small price changes, but the 
same may not be true for larger price changes. This result may in turn be due to the fact that 
consumers have a very inelastic price elasticity of demand for fluid milk. If the retail price of milk 
changes, for example, by 3 percent, the change in per capita quantity of fluid milk demand is 
hardly noticeable. Since processors base their supply on market demand, this will make the own 
supply elasticity very small, which is precisely the case here. The highly inelastic price is not a 
problem when simulating alternative scenarios that are fairly close to one another, e.g., baseline 
advertising vs. 5 percent higher advertising. However, the inelastic price is a problem in the 4
4 Producer net revenue is defined as milk marketings multiplied by the difference between the all-milk price and
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present study where the baseline scenario is very different from the no-national program scenario. 
The problem lies in the fact that the econometric equations were estimated under a policy regime 
where there were two programs. Consequently, when the no-national program scenario is 
simulated, the model coefficients that are used are based on a regime where these actually were 
two programs in placed. This is the famous Lucas critique of econometric policy models.
Second, the quality of the wholesale fluid milk price data is suspect. Fluid milk processor 
price data is hard to come by, and the only source that was available for the time period used in 
the econometric estimation was the wholesale fluid milk price index. If these data are not 
accurate, it is possible that this could be causing the low elasticity.
In any event, based on the expert judgement of several dairy economists, it was decided 
that the 14.5 percent increase in the processor price was unrealistically high, and consequently not 
reported in Table 2. In the future, it is recommended that rather than simulating a baseline and 
no-national program scenario, that closer scenarios be simulated to compute a marginal benefit 
cost ratio. Specifically, a baseline scenario can be compared to a scenario where advertising 
expenditures are increased or decreased by 1 percent. A comparison of these two scenarios 
would measure the marginal impact of the program and would not result in an unrealistically high 
processor price impact.
Conclusion
The purpose of this study was to analyze the impacts of generic milk and cheese advertising on 
dairy markets. The results indicated that generic milk and cheese advertising by dairy farmers and 
fluid milk processors had major market impacts for the dairy industry. The main conclusion of the
feed ration costs per hundredweight.
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study is that the two programs have had a significant and positive impact on fluid milk and cheese 
market prices and quantities, and that farmers are receiving a high return on their investment in 
generic dairy advertising.
The impacts of advertising tend to be more profound in increasing price than quantity, 
which is due to the inelastic nature of demand for milk and cheese. These estimated impacts need 
to be compared with the other options producers and processors have for marketing their product 
(e.g., non-advertising promotion, research, new product development, etc.) in order to determine 
the optimality of the current investment of advertising. Consequently, these results should be 
viewed as a first step in the evaluation process.
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Table 1. Estimated elasticity values for factors affecting the demand for fluid milk and cheese.1
Factors affecting demand Fluid Milk Cheese
Retail price -0.202 -0.400
Per capita income 0.215 0.295
Food away from home -0.198 0.426
Brand advertising 0.011 0.024
Generic advertising 0.057 0.015
Percent of population younger 
than 6 years old 0.744
1 Example: a one percent increase in the retail price of fluid milk is estimated to reduce per capita 
sales of fluid milk by 0.202 percent.
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Table 2. Simulated impacts of the Farmer and Processor Acts on selected market variables, 1996­
98.
Market variable Unit
Baseline
scenario1
No-national
program
scenario2
Percent
difference
Fluid milk demand bil lbs 59.6 58.5 -1.8
Cheese demand bil lbs milk fat 59.6 59.4 -0.3
Total dairy demand bil lbs 156.4 155.1 -0.8
Basic formula price $/cwt 13.46 12.75 -5.3
All milk price $/cwt 14.34 13.61 -5.1
Milk marketings bil lbs 160.3 159.2 -0.7
Benefit-cost ratio3 $ per $1 4.61
1 The baseline scenario reflects the operation of the Farmer and Processor Programs.
2 The no-national program scenario assumes there is no generic advertising for fluid milk and 
cheese.
3The benefit-cost ratio is for the Dairy Act only.
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Appendix
This appendix contains the estimated econometric model of the U.S. dairy industry. Appendix 
table 1 provides the variable definitions and data sources. This is followed by the estimated 
equations. Finally, several appendix figures are included to show how several key variables have 
varied over time.
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Appendix Table 1. Variable definitions and sources.*
RFD = per capita retail fluid milk demand (milkfat equivalent basis), from Dairy Situation and 
Outlook,
RFPBEV = consumer retail price index for fresh milk and cream (1982-84 = 100), divided by 
consumer retail price index for nonalcoholic beverages, both indices from Consumer Price Index, 
INCBEV = per capita disposable personal income (in $1,000), from Employment and Earnings, 
divided by consumer retail price index for nonalcoholic beverages,
FOODAWAY = consumer expenditures on food consumed away from home in bil $, from USDA 
BST = intercept dummy variable for bovine somatotropin, equal to 1 for 1994.1 through 1998.4; 
equal to 0 otherwise,
A5 = percent of U.S. population 5 years old or younger, from Current Population Report,
DUMQ1 = intercept dummy variable for first quarter of year,
DUMQ2 = intercept dummy variable for second quarter of year,
DUMQ3 = intercept dummy variable for third quarter of year,
GFAD = generic fluid milk advertising expenditures (in $1,000), deflated by the media price index, 
from Leading National Advertisers,
BFAD = branded fluid milk advertising expenditures (in $1,000), deflated by the media price index, 
from Leading National Advertisers,
MA(1) = moving average 1 error correction term,
RCD = per capita retail cheese demand (milkfat equivalent basis), computed as commercial cheese 
production minus government cheese purchases by the Commodity Credit Corporation minus changes 
in commercial cheese inventories (from Cold Storage),
RCPMEA = consumer retail price index for cheese (1982-84 = 100), divided by consumer retail price 
index for fat (1982-84 = 100), both indices from Consumer Price Index,
GCAD = = generic cheese advertising expenditures (in $1,000), deflated by the media price index, 
from Leading National Advertisers,
BCAD = branded cheese advertising expenditures (in $1,000), deflated by the media price index, from 
Leading National Advertisers,
AR(1) = AR 1 error correction term,
AR(2) = AR 2 error correction term,
RFS = retail fluid milk supply (bil. lbs. of milkfat equivalent), RFS=RFD*POP (where POP = U.S. 
civilian population),
RFPWFP = consumer retail price index for fresh milk and cream, divided by wholesale fluid milk 
price index (1982 = 100) from Producer Price Index,
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T = time trend, equal to 1 for 1975.1,....,
RCS = retail cheese supply (bil. lbs. of milkfat equivalent), RCS=RCD*POP,
RCPWCP = consumer retail price index for cheese, divided by wholesale cheese price ($/lb.) from 
Dairy Situation and Outlook,
PFEWCP = producer price index for fuel and energy (1967 = 100), from Producer Price Index, 
divided by wholesale cheese price,
WFS = wholesale fluid milk supply (bil. lbs. of milkfat equivalent), WFS = RFS = RFD*POP,
WFPP1 = wholesale fluid milk price index, divided by Class I price for raw milk ($/cwt.), from 
Federal Milk Order Market Statistics,
WCS = wholesale cheese production (bil. lbs. of milkfat equivalent), from Dairy Products Annual 
Summary,
WCPP3 = wholesale cheese price, divided by Class III price for raw milk ($/cwt.) from Federal Milk 
Order Market Statistics,
PFEP3 = = producer price index for fuel and energy (1967 = 100), from Producer Price Index, 
divided by Class III milk price,
FMS = U.S. milk production (bil. lbs.), from Dairy Situation and Outlook,
AMPPFEED = U.S. average all milk price ($/cwt.), divided by the U.S. average dairy ration cost 
($/cwt.), both from Dairy Situation and Outlook,
PCOWPFEED = U.S. average slaughter cow price ($/cwt.) from Dairy Situation and Outlook, 
divided by U.S. average dairy ration cost.
MDP = intercept dummy variable for the Milk Diversion Program equal to 1 for 1984.1 through 
1985.2; equal to 0 otherwise,
DTP = intercept dummy variable for the Dairy Termination Program equal to 1 for 1986.2 through 
1987.3; equal to 0 otherwise,
*An “L” in front of a variable means the variable has been transformed into natural logarithm.
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